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Ȩ Ȩ > ¿¬±¸¹®Çå > ¿µ¹® ³í¹®Áö > TIIS (Çѱ¹ÀÎÅͳÝÁ¤º¸ÇÐȸ)

TIIS (Çѱ¹ÀÎÅͳÝÁ¤º¸ÇÐȸ)

Current Result Document :

ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) Provably-Secure Public Auditing with Deduplication
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) Provably-Secure Public Auditing with Deduplication
ÀúÀÚ(Author) Dongmin Kim   Ik Rae Jeong  
¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) VOL 11 NO. 04 PP. 2219 ~ 2236 (2017. 04)
Çѱ۳»¿ë
(Korean Abstract)
¿µ¹®³»¿ë
(English Abstract)
With cloud storage services, users can handle an enormous amount of data in an efficient manner. However, due to the widespread popularization of cloud storage, users have raised concerns about the integrity of outsourced data, since they no longer possess the data locally. To address these concerns, many auditing schemes have been proposed that allow users to check the integrity of their outsourced data without retrieving it in full. Yuan and Yu proposed a public auditing scheme with a deduplication property where the cloud server does not store the duplicated data between users. In this paper, we analyze the weakness of the Yuan and Yu¡¯s scheme as well as present modifications which could improve the security of the scheme. We also define two types of adversaries and prove that our proposed scheme is secure against these adversaries under formal security models.
Å°¿öµå(Keyword) Public auditing   deduplication   data integrity   tag-unforgeability   proof-unforgebility  
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